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Abstract  
In this article we form the simple prediction that mispricing encourages traders to collect costly 
information that guides managerial decisions at corporate level. Our findings support this 
prediction based on evidence derived from both the US market for corporate control as well as 
the overall variation in aggregate corporate profits. The trading activity in response to the 
temporary mispricing of the merging companies provides useful information that leads to the 
design of high-synergy deals. Such synergies are reflected in an increase in the announcement 
period acquirer abnormal returns and are not reversed in the long-run. At the market-wide 
level, our results suggest that the growth in the overall stock trading volume in response to 
market mispricing is associated with high future corporate profit growth. Overall, after 
controlling for several economic and financial conditions, the temporary mispricing in a 
developed and generally efficient stock market stimulates informative trading, ultimately 
leading to value- and performance-enhancing corporate decisions.  
Keywords: Mispricing; Information; Acquisitions; Acquirer returns; Corporate profits.  
JEL Classification: G14, G34. 
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By aggregating information from investors, the stock market guides corporate investment 
decisions (hereafter corporate decisions) via two channels. First, the reaction of equity 
investors to corporate announcements conveys signals to managers regarding the market’s 
perception about the valuations of the firms they manage. Second, even in the absence of 
corporate announcements that primarily supply new information to investors, the trading 
activity of investors can still transmit new information about their estimates regarding the 
values of the firms. Along these lines, Roll (1988) argues that ‘the financial press misses a great 
deal of relevant information generated privately’ (p. 564). Our objective in this article is to 
provide a comprehensive examination of the conditions under which the second channel is 
likely to provide useful guidance to corporate managers in their corporate decisions. 
Specifically, we ask the following question: when do corporate managers extract information 
from the stock market in order to improve their corporate decisions? 
At first glance, the inclination is to suggest that corporate managers should rely on the 
appraisals of the equity investors when they perceive it to be informationally efficient in order 
to ensure that all the costly information that they require is fully reflected in the prevailing 
prices. However, in their seminal article, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that there is 
limited incentive for market participants to acquire costly information when prices convey all 
the information. Specifically, Grossman and Stiglitz demonstrate that an ‘equilibrium degree of 
disequilibrium’ (p. 393) is required wherein prices reflect information only partially. Under this 
condition, one would expect that investors who allocate valuable resources to information 
collection are compensated for their efforts. 
If the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) conclusion holds, then firms whose shares exhibit some 
degree of mispricing (i.e., prices that differ from the theoretical ideal price in a perfectly 
integrated and efficient market) are likely to be the ones that attract the attention of investors. 
For example, when a company’s share price exhibits a noticeable positive trend, it might 
become subject to increasing coverage by industry experts in order to understand whether the 
prevailing prices reflect growing investment opportunities, among other potential explanations. 
Such increased coverage by industry experts might raise the attention of the company’s 
managers to otherwise overlooked valuable investment opportunities. More importantly, the 
prevailing mispricing incentivizes equity traders to invest in the acquisition of new information 
about the firm’s growth opportunities and hence make trading decisions based on such 
information. While arbitrageurs do not communicate directly with the firm’s managers, their 
trading activities offer credible signals that managers can rely upon in order to steer their 
corporate policies effectively. Consequently, the variation in stock prices due to the trading 
activity of the informed equity investors allows the firm’s managers to infer valuable 
information that they would not otherwise possess about the growth prospects of their firm. As 
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a result, the integration of such information in the managerial decision-making process allows 
the firm’s managers to be engaged in synergy-enhancing investments that can, in turn, foster 
corporate growth, boost profitability, and improve shareholders’ wealth. 
Analytically, we examine whether Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) proposition applies to the 
takeover market. In the US market whereby price noisiness tends to be temporary (Alvarez-
Ramirez, Alvarez, Rodriguez, & Fernandez-Anaya, 2008), we expect the trading activity that 
emerges in response to the mispricing of the acquiring firms’ shares to convey valuable 
information that the managers of these firms successfully incorporate in their takeover plans. 
This trading activity is especially relevant when equity investors realize that the company is 
considering a takeover, start gathering information about the potential synergies of the 
takeover, and subsequently make trading decisions based on such information. As the pre-
acquisition mispricing of the target firm may also motivate investors to collect the rare and 
costly information about the target’s business conditions and growth prospects, we expect the 
trading activity in the target’s shares in response to mispricing to convey valuable information 
that the acquiring firms incorporate in their takeover plans. As a result, the parties involved in 
takeover negotiations – as they finalize their takeover plans – can extract relevant information 
about the prospect of their deals by monitoring the variations in their stock prices. Empirically, 
we predict that the trading activities in response to temporary mispricing in both the acquiring 
and the target firms’ shares are associated with increases in acquirer announcement period 
abnormal returns that are not reversed in the post-announcement period. 
We test this prediction using a dataset that covers 849 public-to-public domestic US 
mergers during the period from January 2001 to December 2014 (inclusive). The Hurst (1951) 
exponent level is used to quantify the firm-level degree of mispricing. This level of mispricing is 
defined as the absolute value of the difference between the estimated Hurst exponent and its 
predicted value under the random walk hypothesis based on the daily stock returns in the t-240 
to t-43 days before the acquisition announcement, where t is the merger announcement day. 
The higher this measure, the more likely it is that the stock prices exhibit either trend-
reinforcing patterns or frequent reversals relative to the random walk before the equity 
investors receive the early signs that the company in considering a takeover. The 43rd day cutoff 
is motivated by previous research, such as Schwert (1996) and Betton et al. (2014), as the day at 
which news about potential acquisitions start to leak to financial markets, which ultimately 
triggers pre-acquisition variations in the merging firms’ prices.1 Our main results suggest that 
the turnover in the merging firms’ shares in the period following the mispricing – from the 43rd 
to the 10th day preceding the acquisition announcement – provides useful information for the 
                                                          
1 Siganos (2013) uses the 30th day before the acquisition announcement as the starting date in measuring the target’s pre-
acquisition price run-up. The findings that we report in this study are not altered qualitatively or quantitatively if cutoff dates 
such as the 60th, 50th, 40th, and 30th day before the acquisition announcement are introduced to the analysis. 
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companies in finalizing their takeover plans, which in turn leads to significant increases in the 
acquirer abnormal returns. 
We recognize that there are potentially several factors that can influence the equity 
investors’ perception of the merger synergies. We form simple theoretical predictions in order 
to account for the impact of such factors in our analysis. To highlight the effect of the 
acquisition’s payment method and the potential overvaluation of the acquiring firm (Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, & Viswanathan, 2005; Rhodes–Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 
2003; Travlos, 1987), we control for the wealth effects arising from the use of stock financing. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that acquiring firms (pre-)owning shares in the target 
firms (i.e., toehold or pre-bid ownership of target shares), and acquiring firms that operate in 
the same industry as their targets (i.e., focused deals), among others, hold relatively more 
information about the merger and are less likely to rely on the guidance offered through the 
stock market’s trading activity. To accommodate these effects, we control for the wealth effects 
of toehold levels (Betton and Eckbo, 2000) as well as the industry relatedness of the merging 
firms (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002). Given that firms with large block-holders are more likely to 
‘listen’ to the market and are more immune to agency problems (Kau, Linck, & Rubin, 2008), we 
also control for the percentage of acquirer shares that are closely held by a small group of 
investors. Overall, our conclusions remain highly consistent after controlling for these effects, 
the acquirer’s and targets’ valuation and growth prospects, in addition to the industry and time 
fixed effects. 
A valid concern regarding the robustness of our results is that the positive effect of the 
share turnover on the acquirer abnormal returns in deals involving mispriced firms is itself an 
illustration of the acquiring and/or the target firms’ mispricing. Consequently, the high acquirer 
(short-run) abnormal returns might be reversed in the post-announcement period. However, 
our results of the analysis of the acquirer long-run abnormal returns are inconsistent with this 
concern. In particular, the positive effect of the stock trading activity in response to pre-
acquisition mispricing on the acquirer announcement period abnormal returns is not reversed 
in the long-run. This evidence supports the notion that the trading activity conveys useful 
information to the merging firms in order to realize high and persistent synergies. 
Previous research also stresses the role of the stock market’s informativeness in affecting 
the variation of corporate investments (Chen, Goldstein, & Jiang, 2007), the efficiency of such 
investments (Durnev, Morck, & Yeung, 2004), and the prediction of corporate earnings (Durnev, 
Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003). These studies employ either the Roll (1986) price non-
synchronicity measure2 (Durnev et al., 2003) or the probability of informed trading (Chen et al., 
                                                          
2 This measure is estimated as the portion of the variation in a company’s stock returns that is not explained by the market 
and industry-related factors. 
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2007; Durnev et al., 2004) to represent the degree of market informativeness. Durnev et al. 
(2004) also relate their use of price informativeness measures to the Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) argument that a lower cost of private information acquisition leads to a higher intensity 
of informed trading. Nevertheless, our analysis differs from these studies in the key aspect of 
highlighting another dimension of Grossman and Stiglitz. While recognizing the role of 
information acquisition cost as a key determinant of the amount of information incorporated 
into stock prices, the main counterintuitive result of Grossman and Stiglitz is that some degree 
of inefficient pricing is needed for the stock market to attract traders that invest in acquiring 
relevant information. It is with this key result in mind that we present the degree of firm-
specific mispricing as a main incentive for relevant information collection. Subsequently, we use 
the share turnover in response to this mispricing as a measure of informed trading. 
Extant studies also find that the merging firms’ managers extract information from the 
stock market’s reaction to merger announcements in order to determine whether the merger 
should be consummated (Luo, 2005; Kau et al., 2008). This result is noticeable when the 
companies have less information than the market (small and high technology firms), and when 
the cancellation of the merger is legally and logistically feasible (Luo, 2005). Moreover, the 
decision to withdraw a deal in response to a negative market reaction is also dependent on 
whether the firms have large block-holders and their CEOs have high pay-performance 
sensitivities (Kau et al., 2008). Our analysis complements these findings in two key ways. First, 
our results suggest that the acquiring firms extract useful information as a result of the stock 
market’s variation in finalizing their takeovers before the official deal announcement. Second, 
while previous research documents an increase in options trading before acquisition 
announcements and treats such an increase as an indicator of informed trading in the options 
market (Jayaraman, Frye, & Sabhenval, 2001; Siougle, Spyrou, & Tsekrekos, 2011), our results 
put further emphasis on the role of the stock market as a source of pre-acquisition informed 
trading. 
We recognize that M&A announcements are not the only venues to study the informative 
role of the stock market in navigating corporate decisions. As a result, we further examine 
whether the findings documented at firm-specific level hold in an aggregate time series analysis 
of overall corporate profit growth. As suggested in the Morck et al. (1990) active informant 
hypothesis, the variation in stock returns can convey useful information about the state of the 
overall economy. When the economy can be in one of multiple equilibria, the stock market can 
aggregate the beliefs of investors to determine which one of many potential equilibria is the 
most likely. Morck et al. (1990) find limited support to this hypothesis. However, if the 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) reasoning holds at the market-wide level, then an increase in the 
stock trading activity in response to temporary market-wide mispricing will be associated with 
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the collection of relevant information that can be partly reflected in the stock prices. As the 
corporate managers adjust their investment plans accordingly, this trading activity must be 
associated with a future increase in corporate profit growth. 
Our results from the Threshold Vector Autoregressive (TVAR) models support this 
prediction. In particular we find that an increase in the overall stock market trading activity in 
response to temporary mispricing – which we measure as the absolute deviation of the 
quarterly level of market-wide Hurst (1951) exponent from its predicted value under the 
random walk hypothesis – is associated with future increases in the growth in corporate profits. 
Put simply, both the firm-specific and aggregate-level evidence reported in this article 
emphasize the role of the stock market activity as an active informant (Chen et al., 2007; Durnev 
et al., 2004, 2003) rather than a simple sideshow (Morck et al., 1990). 
While our results are exclusively related to the US market, further analysis is required to 
determine whether similar evidence persist in other markets with different institutional 
frameworks. Possibly, mispricing leads to informed trading decisions only in liquid markets 
with relatively transparent institutional frameworks and binding legal arrangements. On the 
contrary, in markets with low liquidity, limited transparency and weak legal frameworks, the 
stock market mispricing might not be limited to temporary episodes during which investors try 
to collect new information. Alternatively, instead of being temporary, mispricing might be an 
illustration of more fundamental problems related to the functioning of the stock market and 
the difficulties of incorporating information in the prevailing prices. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on corporate learning from stock prices; Section 3 presents the M&A dataset used in 
the analysis and discusses the main sample statistics; Section 4 describes the estimation of the 
degree of firm-specific pre-acquisition mispricing; Section 5 discusses the empirical results of 
the takeover-related analysis; Section 6 shows the time series analysis of the overall stock 
market mispricing’s impact on overall corporate profits growth, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Corporate Learning from Stock Prices 
The seminal work by Hayek (1945) highlights the informative role of prices in guiding the 
decisions of production and resource allocation. In Hayek’s terminology, market prices solve the 
dispersed knowledge problem by aggregating information from many dissimilar traders to 
guide decision makers in their resource allocation. While Hayek’s analysis was originally 
applied to the goods and services markets, it can be extended to financial markets whereby 
stock prices offer useful guidance for corporate managers in making investment decisions (Dow, 
Goldstein, & Guembel, 2016). Along these lines, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) stress the 
role of serendipity: when investors dedicate substantial efforts to collect information, their 
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increased level of attention allows them, even by chance, to come across (often unexpected) 
valuable information. As a result, a large body of literature has been focused on quantifying the 
extent to which prevailing prices reflect informed trading (Collin-Dufresne & Fos, 2015; Jiang & 
Zhu, 2017; Yan & Zhang, 2014). 
Corporate managers can elicit such information by observing the variations in the stock 
prices of the firms they manage. Such information is therefore a valuable resource for the 
managers in steering their investment strategies. Morck et al. (1990) develop what they refer to 
as the ‘active informant hypothesis’ whereby stock market developments convey useful 
information to corporate managers and consequently predict future variations in corporate 
investments. While Morck et al. (1990) find limited support to this hypothesis in their time 
series analysis, later work using quantifiable measures of price informativeness has shown that 
corporate managers tend to learn from the variations in stock prices about their firm’s 
fundamentals and integrate such information in their investment decisions. Chen et al. (2007), 
for instance, show that the rise in the magnitude of informed trading in a company’s stock 
increases the sensitivity of the company’s investments to stock market developments. 
In the field of M&A, there is strong evidence from the options market that the rumors of 
takeover announcements tend to be preceded by significant increases in the magnitude of 
informed trading (Jayaraman et al., 2001). In turn, Kau et al. (2008) show that the managers of 
the acquiring firms are inclined to listen to the market and consequently respond to negative 
reaction to their takeover announcement by cancelling their deal. Furthermore, Betton et al. 
(2014) test a model whereby the pre-acquisition target price run-up conveys information to the 
merging firms about the synergies of the acquisition. 
While these studies emphasize the role of stock market in guiding investment decisions, 
more attention is required on the incentives of market participants (i.e., equity traders) to 
collect the costly information that is much-needed by corporate managers who aim to adjust 
their investment strategies. The seminal contribution of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
emphasizes the role of price noisiness in incentivizing traders to collect such information. In the 
Grossman and Stiglitz model, security prices accomplish their role in revealing information but 
with some noisiness or even some delays, in order to ensure that the traders investing in the 
acquisition of costly information are ultimately rewarded for their efforts. 
Our empirical analysis highlights the role of mispricing in incentivizing the informed 
trading that allows corporate managers to develop value- and profit-enhancing decisions. Our 
main empirical prediction is that the stock market trading activity is more likely to carry costly 
and relevant information when such activity emerges in response to mispricing. At the firm-
specific level, we expect the share turnover that emerges in response to mispricing in both the 
acquiring and the target firms in M&As to lead to high-synergy deals that are also associated 
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with sustained acquirer abnormal returns. At the market-wide level, the main empirical 
prediction in our time series analysis is that the trading activity that emerges in response to 
temporary mispricing in the stock market is a significant predictor of increases in corporate 
profit growth. 
 
3. Data and Sample Statistics 
Our sample includes all US domestic public-to-public M&As collected from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) M&As Database, which meet the following criteria: the bid is announced 
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2014 (inclusive); the deal is completed and has a 
disclosed deal value of at least $1 million; the acquirer controls 100% of the target shares at the 
deal’s completion date; the deal payment is settled in either cash or stock; the deals announced 
by the same bidder within five trading days of each other are excluded; the acquiring and the 
target firms’ stock prices, market values, and market-to-book value ratios are available from 
Datastream. 
The restriction that both the acquiring and the target firms are listed in a stock exchange is 
introduced to ensure that the degrees of mispricing of both firms are measurable. The 
restriction that the acquirer is ultimately controlling 100% of the target at the deal’s completion 
date is introduced to ensure that the acquirers in the sample have the same objective of full 
target ownership. Furthermore, we limit the sample to full cash and full stock financed deals in 
order to explicitly distinguish between these groups in our multivariate analysis. The analysis is 
limited to domestic US deals to guarantee that the degrees of mispricing are estimated for 
acquirers and targets that operate within the same institutional framework. This follows the 
emphasis by Morck et al. (2001) on the role of institutional frameworks and property rights as 
key determinants of the difference in the degree of informed trading across countries. 
Consequently, focusing on domestic deals ensures that the analysis does not conflate firm-level 
informed trading with the differences in institutional arrangements between the acquirer’s and 
the target’s nations. 
Table 1 presents the annual breakdown of the sample in terms of payment method, 
acquirer and target industry relatedness and target industrial sector. In particular, Panel A 
records the annual distribution of our sampled deals in which: (a) the merger is financed with 
either cash or stocks as the payment method, and (b) the acquisition is either an industry-
focused deal whereby the acquirer and the target share the same two-digit SIC code, or industry 
diversifying whereby the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC codes. The Table 
highlights that the overall M&A activity exhibited its peak in the year 2001 and started declining 
thereafter. The Table also documents that the majority of deals in the sample are cash financed 
(57.83%) and industry focused ones (65.14%). At the target industrial sector level, the majority 
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of deals in our sample appear in the High Technology and Financials sector, with respective 
percentages of 28.39% and 25.44%. In turn, the minority of deals in our sample are in the retail, 
real estate and media sectors. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm- and deal-specific variables that we 
use in our analysis. CAR_ACQ is the acquirer’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns. As in Barbopoulos 
and Sudarsanam (2012) and Fuller et al. (2002), this measure is estimated as the sum of the 
daily differences between the acquirer’s returns and the returns of an overall market index 
(NYSE firms) over the 5-day window (t-2, t+2) around the M&A announcement, t. Brown and 
Warner (1980) show that the use of a market-adjusted model in estimating the abnormal 
returns in an event study is robust, as the adjustment for the firm’s systematic risk does not 
improve the precision of the short-term abnormal returns. The mean level 0.17% is in line with 
previous research suggesting that, on average, M&As do not yield additional wealth to the 
acquiring firm (see Alexandridis et al. (2010)). Nevertheless, the high standard deviation of CAR, 
its maximum (86.69%), and minimum (-33.66%) values suggest a substantial variation in the 
M&A wealth effects among the acquirers. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Moreover, we follow Officer (2003) by dividing the deal value by the target’s market value 
of equity 43 days before the announcement, subtracting 1, and multiplying the result by 100. As 
the case of CAR, the premium also exhibits substantial variation with values that range from -
98% for targets that are close to bankruptcy to a maximum of 653%.3 
DEV_ACQ and DEV_TARG refer to the degrees of the acquirer’s and the target’s pre-
acquisition mispricing, respectively, from the t-243 to the t-43 day preceding the acquisition 
announcement, t. These variables are described in more detail in Section 3. DEV_MKT refers to 
the market-level degree of mispricing and is discussed in more detail in Section 5. 
ACQUIRER_TRADING and TARGET_TRADING are the variables representing the level of 
acquirer and target share turnover, respectively, from the t-43 to the t-10 day preceding the 
acquisition announcement, t. As proposed by Gervais et al. (2001), the trading activity is a proxy 
for the level of investor attention. In the context of our analysis, the increase in this trading 
activity in response to mispricing should reflect the growing role of investors who accumulate 
costly information that guides the merging firms’ synergy-generating strategies. The turnover 
rate is estimated as the average daily ratio of traded shares volume relative to listed shares over 
the corresponding period. The (t-43, t-10) window is chosen to represent the period following 
the pre-acquisition mispricing and preceding the acquisition announcement, when investors are 
                                                          
3 Officer (2003) excludes deals with premium levels higher than 200% or lower than 0%. The results reported in this article 
hold if the same approach is followed. 
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likely to dedicate substantial attention to the merging firms’ stocks and collect relevant 
information about the prospect of the acquisition. In this article we argue that the trading 
activity conveys valuable information that contributes in the design of high-synergy deals by the 
merging firms’ managers who are carefully observing the stock market developments. Table 2 
also covers a rich set of factors that we employ as control variables in our analysis such as the 
acquirer and the target market values and the market-to-book value ratios, 43 days before the 
acquisition’s announcement day. 
Moreover, we include the percentages of target shares owned by the acquiring firm before 
the bid announcement as well as the acquirer shares that are closely held by a limited group of 
family members or institutional shareholders. While Datastream reports the percentage of 
target shares that are closely held, the inclusion of such a variable in our analysis substantially 
reduced our sampled deals. For the same reason, we only include the acquirer Debt-to-Assets 
ratio 43 days before the deal. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of the source of each 
variable, the acronym of each variable, as well as construction of each variable. 
 
4. Measuring Firm-Specific Mispricing 
The rich array of studies evaluating long-range dependence can be divided into two distinct 
branches. The first branch is primarily focused on determining the degree of long-range 
dependence using a quantifiable measure (Cajueiro & Tabak, 2004; Peters, 1994; Saffi & 
Sigurdsson, 2011; Sensoy & Tabak, 2015). The second branch is mainly concerned with 
developing statistics to test the hypothesis of long-range dependence (see Lo (1991) for 
instance). The latter approach represents an interesting research area that depends on the 
statistical assumptions adopted in developing and applying the various long-range dependence 
tests. However, given that the analysis in this article is assembled around the evaluation of the 
variations in the degrees of dependence in stock returns rather than testing propositions 
related to the significance of such dependence, the first approach is adopted. 
The exponent developed by Hurst (1951) is used to quantify the diffusion of information 
into prices. The value of the Hurst exponent determines whether a series: (a) follows a random 
walk when H=0.5, (b) exhibits a trend reinforcing pattern when H>0.5, or (c) displays frequent 
reversals when H<0.5. Following Peters's (1994) introduction of the Fractal Market Hypothesis 
whereby stock returns are hypothesized to exhibit long-range dependence, this measure has 
been used in previous research to study the dynamic behavior of aggregate stock indices (see 
Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2008), Sensoy and Tabak (2015), Cajueiro and Tabak (2004) and Serletis 
and Rosenberg (2007)). 
Compared to alternative measures of mispricing such as the autocorrelation in stock 
returns and the explanatory power of lagged market returns (Saffi & Sigurdsson, 2011), the 
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Hurst exponent has the advantage of providing inferences about the distribution of returns in 
addition to highlighting their degree of autocorrelations. As explained in detail by Fama (1963), 
the Hurst exponent is the inverse of the characteristic exponent α of the characteristic function 
for Mandelbrot’s stable paretian distributions.  =0.5 indicates the presence of a normal 
distribution (α =2), the only paretian stable distribution with a finite variance. When   
 
 
 is in 
the interval 0 < α < 2, the family of paretian distributions has no finite variance and the extreme 
tails of distributions are higher than those of the normal distribution. The most important 
consequence is that the variance exists (i.e., is finite) only in the extreme case where α = 2. The 
mean, however, exists as long as α > 1. Moreover, by quantifying the extent of information 
diffusion into prices, rather than the magnitude of overvaluation or undervaluation, the Hurst 
exponent –as a measure of mispricing– is less restrictive compared to alternative measures such 
as Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) which are based on the theoretical decomposition of the 
company’s market-to-book ratio. 
In estimating the Hurst exponent, Mandelbrot (1973) emphasizes the superiority of the R/S 
analysis to alternative techniques in detecting long-run dependence. To introduce this analysis, 
we follow the same notations adopted by Weron (2002). First, for the window covering the t-
240 to t-43 days period before the M&A announcement, the series of each company’s stock 
returns over the risk-free rate of length   is divided into   subseries of length  . For each 
subseries,       , the mean    and the standard deviation    are estimated. Second, these 
returns are normalized by subtracting the sample mean            for each subsample 
          to create the cumulative series         
 
   . Third, the range    
                                  is calculated and scaled by dividing it by   . The 
rescaled range of all subseries of length   is: 
 
        
 
 
      
 
   
 (1) 
which asymptotically follows the power law: 
            
  (2) 
By artificially increasing  ,   can be estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) using the 
following regression: 
 log                   (3) 
However, following the observation that the estimated level of the Hurst exponent   deviates 
significantly from 0.5 in small samples, Anis and Lloyd (1976) provide expected values of the 
R/S analysis under the null hypothesis of random walks.4 
                                                          
4 This equation was initially provided by Anis and Lloyd (1976) and was then modified by Peters (1994). More specifically, 
the term  
     
 
  was added by Peters to provide further improvement of the R/S analysis’s performance in small samples.  
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 (4) 
Γ is the Euler gamma function. For the 197 (t-240, t-43) day window of each acquirer and target, 
the expected H level is estimated by introducing the expected value from Equation (4) in the 
regression Equation (3). The resulting expected value is 0.557. Hence, the variables DEV_ACQ 
and DEV_TARG in Table 2 refer to the absolute value of the difference between the estimated 
Hurst exponent value and 0.557796 for the acquirer and the target, respectively. 
The descriptive statistics for each of the variables are reported in Table 2. The Table shows 
that the estimated mispricing measures – DEV_ACQ and DEV_TARG – take values ranging from 0 
whereby the stock is efficiently priced, to 0.55 at which the Hurst exponent fully deviates from 
the predicted value under efficient pricing. Such dispersion in the estimated degree of 
mispricing, while suggesting various degrees of firm-specific pricing, can also be influenced by 
the noisiness in our estimation. Such noisiness might be due to the choice of the estimation 
window or the presence of outliers. To minimize these effects in our results, we employ the 
dummy variables MISPRICED_ACQ and MISPRICES_TARG which are assigned the value of 1 if 
variables DEV_ACQ and DEV_TARG take values that exceed their median levels, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3 provides a comparison between the mean values of the empirical variables among 
acquirers (targets) that experienced pre-acquisition mispricing and acquirers (targets) that did 
not experience such mispricing. With respect to the wealth effect of takeovers on the acquirer’s 
shareholders, the univariate evidence reported in Table 3 suggests that acquirers shareholders 
receive 1% higher CAR in deals including pre-acquisition mispriced acquirers (targets) 
compared to deals in which the acquirers (targets) did not experience a period of mispricing. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Note that the means of most of the covariates do not differ between the deals in which the 
acquirer (target) experiences pre-acquisition mispricing and the deals in which the acquirer 
(target) does not experience such a pre-bid mispricing. This suggests that, at least at the 
univariate level, the degree of pre-acquisition mispricing and consequently informed trading is 
not particularly dependent on specific firm characteristics. 
 
5. Firm-Level Results and Discussion 
The informed trading in response to the mispricing of a company’s shares allows the managers 
and the potential acquiring firms to extract valuable information that will be useful in steering 
their subsequent investment decisions. If this empirical prediction holds, we should then expect 
that the turnover in the shares of the acquirers and targets whose securities displayed a high 
degree of pre-acquisition mispricing to predict high acquirer announcement period abnormal 
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returns. A potential concern regarding these predictions is that the high abnormal returns, if 
present, might reflect an inaccurate assessment of the deal’s wealth effects due to the merging 
firms’ pre-acquisition mispricing. As a result, this section also analyses the post-announcement 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns to determine whether the announcement period abnormal 
returns are reversed in the post-announcement period. 
 
5.1. Announcement Period Returns 
Table 4 presents the multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of acquirer 
announcement period 5-day CAR. The estimated models have the following specification: 
 
                                                
                                   
                                         
 
   
    
(5) 
where Model (1) does not include year and industry fixed-effects while Model (2) includes 
them.5       
 
    presents the effects of the control variables and    is an error term with an 
expected value of 0.    and    represent the effect of the pre-acquisition trading activity in 
response to low mispricing for the acquirer and the target, respectively.       represent the 
average effect of the trading activity in the acquiring firm’s shares on the announcement period 
acquirer abnormal returns in response to high pre-acquisition mispricing.       represent 
this effect based on the trading in the target’s securities. If our main empirical predictions hold, 
   and    should have significant positive effects on the acquirer CAR. This finding would 
support the notion that the trading activity in response to high pre-acquisition mispricing 
transfers a more informative aspect than the trading activity that emerges when the level of 
mispricing is relatively low. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Table 4 presents the two models following the specification (5). Interestingly, the wealth 
effects of both the acquirer’s and the target’s pre-acquisition activity are statistically significant 
only when this activity is preceded by high degrees of mispricing. In Model (1), the coefficients 
associated with ACQUIRER_TRADING and TARGET_TRADING (-0.46 and -042 respectively) are 
statistically insignificant. However, the coefficients associated with ACQUIRER_TRADING  
MISPRICED_ACQ and TARGET_TRADING  MISPRICED_TARG (1.01 and 1.18) are positive, 
larger in magnitude, and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, when year and 
industry fixed-effects are added in Model (2), the level of the statistical significance of these 
coefficients is reduced. Nevertheless, both these effects remain significant at the 10% 
                                                          
5 The levels of pre-acquisition turnover for both the acquiring and the target firms do not differ between high and low levels 
of mispricing. Nevertheless, our main prediction is not that trading activity that arises in response to mispricing is 
necessarily high but rather that such activity carries relevant information that guides the merging firms’ takeover plans. 
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significance level. This results supports the application of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
analysis in the takeover market by suggesting that the pre-acquisition trading activity, in both 
the acquirer’s and the target’s shares, presents a significant predictor of acquirer abnormal 
retruns when this activity follows a period of temporary mispricing. 
As discussed in Section 1 (Introduction Section), we control for the effect of various firm- 
and deal-related factors that influence the deal’s synergies and also the market’s perception of 
such synergies. To highlight the wealth effects of stock financing on acquirer abnormal returns 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes–Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005), a 
dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is stock financed (STOCK) is added to our 
analysis, among the other factors that we control for. To emphasize the effect of the acquiring 
firm’s familiarity with the target firms’ business environment, we employ two proxies: (a) we 
control for the effect of toeholds (TOEHOLD_ACQ) and (b) we control for the effect of cross-
industry acquisitions (DVRD). Moreover, our analysis accounts for the percentage of acquirer 
shares that are closely held by large blocks of shareholders that are likely to ‘listen’ to the 
market and are immune to agency problems (Kau et al., 2008). In addition, we control for the 
effect of the premium offered to the target firm to control for the possibility that the market 
might treat the payment of high premia as a sign of overpayment or high synergies in the deal 
(Antoniou, Arbour, & Zhao, 2008). 
We also control for the effects of firm-specific factors that potentially affect the equity 
investors’ ability to accurately assess the effects of the announced takeovers on acquirer value. 
Both the acquiring and the target firms’ sizes are controlled for following the observation by 
Roll (1981) that investors face substantial difficulties in assessing the riskiness of small 
companies. Noteworthy, the smaller stocks are difficult to undertake arbitrage with because of 
the high fixed trading costs. Moreover, we control for the wealth effects of the merging firms’ 
market-to-book value ratio following Lakonishok et al's (1994) findings related to the equity 
investors’ overvaluation of growth companies, undervaluation of value companies, and the 
temporary difficulties in immediately arbitraging away such misvaluations. An alternative 
reason for including the market-to-book value ratio in our analysis relates to the possibility that 
its decline is likely to be associated with financial distress, which makes companies more 
difficult to value, as well as the correction of their mispricing highly costly (Chelley-Steeley, 
Lambertides, & Savva, 2017). In addition to being proxies for valuation difficulties, the merging 
firms’ sizes and market-to-book value ratios can also proxy for the potential synergies to be 
realized from the deal. Lastly, we control for the level of pre-acquisition riskiness for both the 
acquiring and the target companies by introducing the standard deviation of their abnormal 
returns to the analysis. While we do not explicitly interpret the effects of these variables, it is 
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important to note that our findings remain both economically and statistically significant after 
controlling for these effects. 
 
 
5.2. Post-announcement Abnormal Returns 
To examine whether the increases in the acquirer announcement period CAR in response to 
mispricing are reversed in the post-announcement period, we examine in a multivariate 
framework the variation in the acquirer post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs). The acquirer holding period abnormal returns, which are the differences between the 
cumulative returns of investment in the acquirer shares and those in the market index, are 
computed for the holding periods of 12 and 36 months from the end of the deal’s announcement 
month. The BHARs are analyzed in a multivariate framework within the following equation: 
 
                                                
                                   
                                         
 
   
    
(6) 
which has the same specification as Equation (5) with the dependent variable being         , 
which is the acquirer i’s BHARs for the  -months period following the the end of the deal’s 
announcement month. If the positive announcement period abnormal returns driven by trading 
activity in response to mispricing are themselves an illustration of such mispricing, then    and 
   should be negative and significant to highlight a reversal in the announcement period wealth 
effects. In both Models (1) and (2), with and without year and industry fixed-effects 
respectively, none of the coefficients associated with ACQUIRER_TRADING, TARGET_TRADING, 
ACQUIRER_TRADING  MISPRICED_ACQ and TARGET_TRADING  MISPRICED_TARG are 
statistically significant. Hence, the initial wealth effects of share turnover in response to 
mispricing effects are not reversed in the long-run. Such results support the proposition that the 
share turnover in response to acquirer and target mispricing provides information to the 
merging firms to earn persistent synergies to their takeovers. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
6. Time Series Analysis 
6.1. Time variation in the market Hurst exponent 
One of the main tasks in this article is to investigate whether the firm-level analysis that has 
been executed in the preceding sections also applies to the aggregate relationship between the 
degree of market mispricing and the growth rates in corporate profits. Within the context of the 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) conclusion, temporary market-wide mispricing can incentivize the 
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equity investors to collect valuable information about the overall macroeconomic environment. 
Such information can help corporations adjust their investment plans in a way that will 
ultimately foster corporate growth, boost profitability, and improve shareholders’ wealth. We 
expect, ceteris paribus, the growth in stock market trading activity that follows the increases in 
market-wide mispricing to be associated with future increases in corporate profits growth. 
Accordingly, in order to analyze the impact of the variation of market-wide mispricing, we 
measure the quarterly degree of market efficiency as the Hurst exponent of the daily excess 
returns of the 63 trading days covered in each quarter from 1970 through 2014. The levels of 
excess returns are for the value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. These excess returns are retrieved from Professor 
Kenneth French’s website. As in Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2008), our estimations highlight erratic 
dynamics of persistent and anti-persistent behavior in the stock market. Figure 1 depicts the 
time-varying quarterly levels of the estimated Hurst exponent measures for the US stock market 
from the first quarter of 1970 until the fourth quarter of 2014. As argued by Alvarez-Ramirez et 
al. (2008), the long-term trend of the US stock market’s Hurst exponent is negative, suggesting 
an inclination towards more efficient behavior. The authors attribute this increase in market 
efficiency to the free-floating currency arrangements, the free capital flows and the increasing 
participatory aspects of financial markets following the end of the Bretton Woods system. 
Moreover, the periods of market turbulence – such as the 1987 and 2007 crashes – are 
characterized by Hurst exponent levels below 0.5. Such levels reflect the frequent reversals in 
stock returns and the increasing volatility levels that tend to emerge during these periods of 
market instability. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
6.2. TVAR model 
The Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR) models (Galvao, 2003; Tong, 1983; Tsay, 1998) 
present a flexible channel for testing our empirical predictions at the market-wide level. TVARs 
are piecewise linear models where the values of a pre-chosen threshold variable determine 
various autoregressive regimes. This family of models is able to capture various non-linear 
relations, multiple equilibria, and also asymmetric reactions from the endogenous variables. 
Moreover, the coefficients within each regime can be recovered with computational ease via 
simple sum of least squares minimization. In applying these models, the empiricist does not 
have to determine a priori threshold levels. Instead, a grid search is applied to determine the 
threshold levels that minimize the sum of squared residuals while estimating the OLS 
coefficients. This method is known as Conditional Least Squares (CLS). We estimate the 
following two-regime TVAR model: 
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  (7) 
In this model,         is the pre-determined threshold variable and   is the estimated 
threshold value. This measure is used to determine the market-wide mispricing and consists of 
absolute value of the difference between the estimated Hurst exponent and its predicted value 
of 0.51 under the null hypothesis of random walk. 
    is the 4 × 1 column vector that includes DEV_MKT, the growth in corporate profits 
(PROFIT_GROWTH), the stock market’s excess returns (EXCESS_RETURNS), and the quarterly 
growth rate in the S&P 500’s volume of traded shares (VOLUME_GROWTH).   ,      , are 4 × 1 
column vectors of constants. The matrices                
       
  are estimated with   
being the lag operator. The lag order is set at 3 according to the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). The error term    is the normally distributed error term with an expected value of 0.6 
Table 6 reports the equations that explain the variation in the stock market trading activity and 
corporate profits growth in the estimated TVAR model. The estimated threshold value of 
market-wide mispricing (0.058) separates the overall model into two sub-models. The first sub-
model covers 74% of the observations while the remaining 26% are covered in the second sub-
model. As predicted, the growth in the traded volume of the S&P 500 shares predicts future 
growth in corporate profits only in the regime that emerges in response to high market 
mispricing (DEV_MKT>0.058). In particular, the two-quarter lag of S&P 500 trading volume 
growth (VOLUME_GROWTH(-2)) in this regime has a positive and significant effect on the 
growth in corporate profits. One can interpret this finding as evidence that an increased trading 
stock market activity in response to market-wide mispricing proves critical information to 
corporations seeking to steer their investment strategies to realize higher profits. Interestingly, 
in the low market mispricing regime (DEV_MKT≤0.058), the growth in the traded volume of the 
S&P 500 does not predict future variations in corporate profits. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Overall, the findings presented above support the ‘active informant hypothesis’ postulated 
by Morck et al. (1990) whereby the variation in stock returns conveys useful information about 
the overall state of the economy and consequently guides corporate investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, the distinguishing aspect of these findings is their emphasis on the role of 
inefficient pricing as a key incentive for relevant information collection. More specifically, the 
conclusion of the time series results is in line with the results of the firm-level analysis 
suggesting that the periods of temporary mispricing offer companies with a valuable 
                                                          
6 In untabulated results, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for the empirical variables in the estimations based on the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
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opportunity to extract performance-improving information that boosts profitability and 
shareholder wealth. 
These results should be interpreted within the context of the generally efficient and liquid 
US stock market in which mispricing patterns tend to be temporary. More specifically, 
mispricing patterns in less developed markets might reflect fundamental problems related to 
the lack of liquidity and the weak legal framework that limit investor participation. 
Consequently, further empirical investigation is required to determine whether our findings 
hold in non-US contexts, especially in less developed markets. 
 
6.3. Testing Non-linearity 
In order for the choice of TVAR models rather than linear models to be appropriate, the tested 
threshold effects should be statistically significant overall. The multivariate extension of the 
linearity test advanced by Hansen (1999) and Lo and Zivot (2001) is used to assess the level of 
this significance. This test computes Likelihood Ratio (LR) test based on the covariance matrix 
attached to each model. The LR statistic can be presented as follows: 
                               (6) 
In Equation (6),     is the estimated covariance matrix of the model under the null 
hypothesis of no threshold effect;     is the estimated covariance matrix under the alternative of 
a two-regime model; and   is the number of observations in the series. The bootstrap 
distribution of this statistic is based on (a) resampling the residuals from the model under the 
null hypothesis, and (b) estimating the threshold parameter and computing the test. Results are 
obtained by using the middle 70% of the sorted observations based on Hansen's (1996) 
recommendation that the optimal trimming level is 15%. When this test is applied to the TVAR 
model in Table 6, the resulting p-value is 0.001. This significant threshold effect further 
validates the use of the TVAR model in the time series analysis in Section 6.2. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This article traces the implications of investors’ efforts to collect rare and costly information, 
especially in response to periods of inefficient pricing, on acquirer abnormal returns. In the 
main analysis, we predict that the increase in mispricing should motivate investors to collect 
costly information that also guides corporate managers in making value- and performance-
enhancing corporate decisions. 
By using the deviation of the Hurst exponent from its predicted value under the random 
walk hypothesis as a proxy for both the firm-level and the market-wide degree of mispricing, 
the findings offer strong support to our predictions. We find that the trading activity in the 
shares of the acquiring and the target firms – especially when such shares have been subject to 
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temporary mispricing – presents a significant predictor of increases acquirer announcement 
period abnormal returns. Such abnormal returns are not reversed in the post-announcement 
period. This result is robust to the inclusion in our estimations of various controls reflecting 
deal- and firm-related characteristics. In turn, at the market-wide level, the increase in the 
overall degree of mispricing is associated with future increases in corporate profits growth, 
after controlling for the effects of the prevailing financial conditions. 
Overall, our results emphasize the role of the stock market’s informativeness in influencing 
corporate investment decisions and performance, especially when some degree of mispricing 
motivates equity investors to collect rare and costly firm-specific information that guides 
corporate decisions. Nevertheless, we are still cautious in generalizing our findings into non-US 
contexts due to the requirement of controlling for various factors such as the degree of stock 
market development and the institutional arrangements that govern the market. The 
investigation of these effects in a cross-country analysis presents a fruitful area for future 
research. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
 
Variable 
(Acronym) 
Description Source 
Acquirer’s CAR 
(CAR_ACQ)  
The acquirer’s 5-day (-2, 2) announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns. The abnormal return in each day is the difference 
between the firm’s returns and the value-weighted returns of NYSE 
firms.  
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Closely Held Shares 
(CLOSELYHELD_ACQ) 
The percentage of the target’s shares that are closely held by a small 
group of investors. 
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Debt-to-Assets 
(DEBT_ACQ) 
The acquirer’s ratio of Debt to Assets 43 days prior to the bid 
announcement. 
SDC 
Acquirer’s Market Value 
(MV_ACQ) 
The acquirer’s market value of equity 43 days prior to bid 
announcement, in millions of dollars.  
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Market-to-Book 
Value 
(MTBV_ACQ) 
The market value of the acquirer 43 days before the acquisition, 
divided by its book value of equity from the most recent accounting 
statement prior to the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Market-to-Book 
Value 
(MTBV_TARG) 
The market value of the target 43 days before the acquisition, 
divided by its book value of equity from the most recent accounting 
statement prior to the bid announcement. 
Datastream 
Acquirer’s Mispricing 
(DEV_ACQ) 
The absolute value of the difference between the estimated Hurst 
exponent of the acquirer’s daily returns and this exponent’s 
predicted value (0.557796) under the random walk hypothesis. The 
daily returns used to estimate the Hurst exponent cover the 240 to 
43 days that precede the bid announcement.  
Datastream + 
Authors’ Estimations 
Acquirer’s Pre-Acquisition 
Standard Deviation 
(SD_ACQ)  
The standard deviation of the acquirer’s daily abnormal returns for 
the 240 to 43 days that precede the bid announcement. 
SDC 
Acquirer’s Toehold 
(TOEHOLD_ACQ)  
The portion of the target’s shares that are held by the acquirer 
before the deal’s announcement. 
SDC 
Buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of the acquiring firm 
for x years following the 
acquisition 
(BHAR( )) 
The acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the period of   
months following the acquisition. 
Datastream 
Cash Financed Transactions 
(CASH) 
Dummy=1 if the consideration is 100% financed with cash and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Diversifying Deals 
(DVRD) 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC 
codes, and 0 otherwise (FCSD). 
SDC 
GDP Growth  
(GDP_GROWTH) 
The quarterly (annualized) growth rate of real gross domestic 
product.  
The US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Growth in the Stock Market’s 
Trading Volume 
(VOLUME_GROWTH) 
The quarterly growth rate in the total number of traded shares of 
the companies listed in the S&P 500. 
Datasream 
Market’s Mispricing 
(DEV_MKT) 
The absolute value of the difference between the estimated Hurst 
exponent of the stock market’s daily excess returns and this 
exponent’s predicted value under the random walk hypothesis in 
each quarter. The daily returns used to estimate the Hurst exponent 
cover the 63 trading days in each quarter. 
Datastream + 
Authors’ Estimations 
Mispriced Acquirer 
(MISPRICED_ACQ) 
Dummy=1 if DEV_ACQ exceeds its median level of 0.12, and 0 
otherwise. 
Datastream + 
Authors’ Estimations 
Mispriced Target Dummy=1 if DEV_TARG exceeds its median level of 0.12, and 0 Datastream + 
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(MISPRICED_TARG) otherwise. Authors’ Estimations 
Premium Paid in the Deal 
PREMIUM (%) 
The deal’s value divided by the target firm’s market value 43 days 
before the acquisition, minus 1. The resulting measure is multiplied 
by 100.  
SDC + Datastream 
Profits Growth 
(PROF_GROWTH) 
The seasonally adjusted quarterly (annualized) growth rate of 
corporate profits level after tax.  
The US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Stock Financed Acquisitions 
(STOCK) 
Dummy=1 when the consideration is 100% financed with stocks 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Target’s Market Value 
(MV_TARG) 
Target’s market value of equity 43 days prior to bid announcement, 
in millions of dollars. 
Datastream 
 
 
 
Continued 
Target’s Mispricing 
(DEV_TARG) 
The absolute value of the difference between the estimated Hurst 
exponent of the target’s daily returns and this exponent’s predicted 
value (0.557796) under the random walk hypothesis. The daily 
returns used to estimate the Hurst exponent cover the 240 to 43 
days that precede the bid announcement. 
Datastream + 
Authors’ Estimations 
Target’s Pre-Acquisition 
Standard Deviation 
(SD_TARG)  
The standard deviation of the target’s daily returns for the 240 to 
43 days that precede the bid announcement  
SDC 
The Acquirer’s pre-acquisition 
trading 
(ACQUIRER_TRADING) 
The average daily ratio of the acquirer’s traded shares to listed ones 
for the period ranging from 43 to 10 days before the acquisition 
announcement. 
Datastream 
The Acquirer’s pre-acquisition 
trading 
(TARGET_TRADING) 
The average daily ratio of the target’s traded shares to listed shares 
for the period ranging from 43 to 10 days before the acquisition 
announcement. 
Datastream 
The Stock Market’s Excess 
Returns 
(EXCESS_RETURNS) 
The difference between the quarterly level of market returns and 
the risk free rate of interest.  
Professor Kenneth 
French’s website 
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Table 1: Annual distribution of our sampled deals 
 
  Panel A Panel B 
YEAR ALL CASH STOCK FCSD DVRD IND HCR CST MAT MED RTL CPS HT EPW TLC FIN RST 
2001 124 47 77 85 39 6 11 4 2 3 1 7 39 4 5 41 1 
2002 67 35 32 41 26 2 10 1 3 4 3 4 19 2 3 16 0 
2003 72 34 38 49 23 1 7 1 0 1 1 7 18 3 4 26 3 
2004 79 41 38 51 28 3 14 3 2 1 2 7 22 4 2 18 1 
2005 68 40 28 38 30 5 11 2 2 2 1 3 22 1 3 14 2 
2006 73 53 20 41 32 2 8 3 2 3 1 2 24 5 2 18 3 
2007 68 53 15 39 29 4 12 1 3 5 2 4 19 0 4 13 1 
2008 38 28 10 25 13 2 7 0 0 0 2 0 16 2 1 8 0 
2009 38 17 21 25 13 1 5 3 1 0 0 2 13 5 2 5 1 
2010 57 45 12 39 18 5 9 1 1 0 0 2 25 2 2 10 0 
2011 38 23 15 29 9 3 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 3 10 4 
2012 36 23 13 23 13 2 3 1 0 0 1 3 8 2 3 13 0 
2013 45 27 18 36 9 2 6 2 0 1 2 3 7 4 1 15 2 
2014 46 25 21 32 14 1 8 3 3 3 1 3 6 4 3 9 2 
N 849 491 358 553 296 39 117 25 24 23 17 47 241 42 38 216 20 
% 100.00 57.83 42.17 65.14 34.86 4.59 13.78 2.94 2.83 2.71 2.00 5.54 28.39 4.95 4.48 25.44 2.36 
 
Note: Panel A represents the annual distribution of public-to-public M&A bids announced by US acquirers between January 1st, 2001 and December 31st, 2014. The distribution of the sample is presented 
according to the total number of transactions (ALL), method of payment (Cash or Stock), and whether the acquisition is industry-focused (FCSD) or diversifying. Panel B represents the yearly distribution of 
the M&A bids with respect to the target’s sector. The sectors, as reported by SDC, are: Industrials (IND), Healthcare (HCR), Consumer Staples (CST), Materials (MAT), Media and Entertainment (MED), Retail 
(RTL), Consumer Products (CPS), High-Technology (HT), Energy and Power (EPW), Telecommunications (TLC), Financials (FIN) and Real Estate (RST).
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Max Min SD 
CAR_ACQ (%)  -0.17 -0.16 86.69 -33.66 9.06 
PREMIUM (%) 53.42 41.89 653.71 -98.16 65.49 
DEV_ACQ 0.14 0.12 0.55 0.00 0.11 
DEV_TARG 0.15 0.12 0.55 0.00 0.11 
MV_TARG (m$) 837 166 53535 1.19 3076 
MV_ACQ (m$) 19702 2579 525775 3.69 44881 
MTBV_ACQ  3.29 1.83 231.55 0.09 9.44 
MTBV_TARG  2.71 1.96 26.94 0.03 2.60 
TOEHOLD_ACQ (%) 2.92 0.00 95.32 0.00 12.92 
CLOSELYHELD_ACQ (%) 12.88 6.78 93.96 0.01 15.91 
SD_TARG (%)  3.63 3.00 22.01 0.00 2.42 
SD_ACQ (%)  2.60 2.00 23.47 0.64 01.88 
DEBT_ACQ (%) 20.35 18.60 78.80 0.00 16.05 
ACQUIRER_TRADING (%) 0.92 0.57 14.74 0.00 1.27 
TARGET_TRADING (%) 0.70 0.38 8.39 0.01 0.93 
 
Note: This table represents descriptive statistics for the continuous covariates in the sample. For each empirical variable, the mean, 
median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation values are reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the 
variables. 
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Table 3: Univariate analysis 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Mean in deals 
in which the acquirer 
had pre-bid mispricing 
(2) 
Mean in deals  
in which the 
acquirer 
did not have pre-
bid mispricing 
(1) - (2) 
 
(3) 
Mean in 
deals 
in which the 
target 
had pre-bid 
mispricing 
(4) 
Mean in deals  
in which the 
target 
did not have pre-
bid mispricing 
(3) –(4) 
CAR_ACQ (%)  0.38 -0.71 1.08* 0.58 -0.89 1.44** 
PREMIUM (%) 55.68 51.22 4.46 55.82 51.04 4.78 
MV_TARG (m$) 788.11 885.72 -97.61 821.86 853.04 -31.19 
MV_ACQ (m$) 19497.24 19902.55 -405.31 19036.34 20369.32 -1332.98 
MTBV_ACQ  3.11 3.48 -0.37 3.64 2.94 0.70 
MTBV_TARG  2.66 2.76 -0.10 2.65 2.77 -0.12 
TOEHOLD_ACQ (%) 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.01 
CLOSELYHELD_ACQ (%) 0.28 0.33 -0.05* 0.32 0.29 0.02 
SD_TARG (%) 3.60 3.67 -0.08 3.53 3.73 -0.20 
SD_ACQ (%)  2.61 2.60 -0.02 2.52 2.69 -0.2 
DEBT_ACQ (%) 20.88 19.84 1.04 20.28 20.43 -0.15 
ACQUIRER_TRADING (%) 0.95 0.89 0.06 0.93 0.92 0.01 
TARGET_TRADING (%) 0.76 0.72 -0.04 0.69 0.72 -0.03 
 
Note: This table reports the mean value of each empirical variable employed in the analysis of the group of deals in which the 
acquirers (targets) experienced periods of pre-bid mispricing and the group of deals in which the acquirers (targets) did not 
experience such mispricing. We also report the difference between each variable’s mean in the deals in which the acquirer (target) 
experienced pre-bid mispricing and the mean in deals in which the acquirer (target) did not experience pre-bid mispricing. The 
significance of the t-test with the null hypothesis that this difference is equal to 0 is also reported. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Acquirer announcement period CAR 
 
Dependent Variable CAR_ACQ CAR_ACQ 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 3.362 
(2.159) 
1.3617 
(2.765) 
ACQUIRER_TRADING -0.441 
(0.447) 
-0.388 
(0.487) 
TARGET_TRADING -0.444 
(0.488) 
-0.508 
(0.480) 
ACQUIRER_TRADING x MISPRICED_ACQ 1.006** 
(0.455) 
0.898* 
(0.475) 
TARGET_TRADING x MISPRICED_TARG 1.199** 
(0.613) 
1.074* 
(0.622) 
DEV_ACQ -0.041 
(2.927) 
0.552 
(2.927) 
DEV_TARG 3.369 
(2.764) 
3.734 
(2.723) 
STOCK -2.768*** 
(0.658) 
-3.027*** 
(0.273) 
DVRD -0.138 
(0.634) 
-0.022 
(0.626) 
ln(MV_TARG) -0.540** 
(0.254) 
-0.585** 
(0.268) 
ln(MV_ACQ) -0.007 
(0.224) 
0.073 
(0.224) 
MTBV_ACQ 0.001 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
MTBV_TARG -0.197 
(0.184) 
-0.137 
(0.192) 
TOEHOLD_ACQ -0.323 
(1.519) 
-0.802 
(1.462) 
CLOSELYHELD_ACQ 0.017 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
SD_TARG -0.343* 
(0.198) 
-0.295 
(0.230) 
SD_ACQ 0.605 
(0.404) 
0.757 
(0.467) 
DEBT_ACQ 0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.037 
(0.022) 
PREMIUM -0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
Year and Industry Effects NO YES 
N 849 849 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.06 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the 5-day announcement period acquirer Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR_ACQ) in the takeover deals covered in the sample. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 5: The acquirer long-term BHARs 
 
Dependent Variable BHAR (12) BHAR (36) 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) 
Intercept 6.657 
(11.547) 
-5.065 
(10.601) 
ACQUIRER_TRADING -1.033 
(1.816) 
-0.768 
(1.817) 
TARGET_TRADING 2.706 
(2.175) 
2.576 
(2.180) 
ACQUIRER_TRADING x MISPRICED_ACQ -0.297 
(2.036) 
-0.653 
(2.038) 
TARGET_TRADING x MISPRICED_TARG 2.584 
(2.591) 
2.498 
(2.595) 
DEV_ACQ -17.683 
(13.998) 
-16.656 
(13.962) 
DEV_TARG -8.791 
(13.817) 
-7.359 
(13.840) 
STOCK -3.028 
(3.344) 
-2.527 
(3.329) 
DVRD -0.213 
(2.926) 
-0.193 
(2.931) 
ln(MV_TARG) -0.710 
(1.262) 
-1.118 
(1.257) 
ln(MV_ACQ) 0.708 
(0.986) 
1.219 
(0.970) 
MTBV_ACQ -0.150 
(0.142) 
-0.142 
(0.142) 
MTBV_TARG -0.671 
(0.568) 
-0.731 
(0.569) 
TOEHOLD_ACQ 8.181 
(5.732) 
9.229* 
(5.737) 
CLOSELYHELD_ACQ -0.044 
(0.092) 
-0.019 
(0.091) 
SD_TARG -0.319 
(0.872) 
-0.052 
(0.870) 
SD_ACQ 1.127 
(1.780) 
1.927* 
(1.143) 
DEBT_ACQ -0.032 
(0.097) 
-0.025 
(0.097) 
PREMIUM -0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
Year and Industry Effects YES YES 
N 848 757 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.03 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the buy-and-hold acquirer returns in the takeover 
deals covered in the sample. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
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Table 6: TVAR model of the effects of market mispricing 
 
 DEV_MKT (-3) ≤ 0.04 (61.9%) DEV_MKT (-3) > 0.04 (38.1%) 
Dependent Variable VOLUME_GROWTH PROFIT_GROWTH VOLUME_GROWTH PROFIT_GROWTH 
Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.754 
(3.349) 
0.488 
(2.043) 
22.657*** 
(6.147) 
-4.261 
(3.750) 
VOLUME_GROWTH (-1) -0.165 
(0.107) 
-0.118* 
(0.065) 
-0.437*** 
(0.124) 
0.116 
(0.076) 
VOLUME_GROWTH (-2) -0.288*** 
(0.098) 
0.012 
(0.060) 
-0.471*** 
(0.112) 
0.176** 
(0.068) 
VOLUME_GROWTH (-3) -0.031 
(0.093) 
-0.144** 
(0.057) 
-0.171 
(0.127) 
0.080 
(0.078) 
DEV_MKT(-1) 141.456*** 
(42.276) 
-28.784 
(25.794) 
-42.038 
(52.356) 
39.876 
(31.944) 
DEV_MKT(-2) 63.599 
(45.601) 
39.782 
(27.822) 
3.173 
(47.718) 
31.563 
(29.114) 
DEV_MKT(-3) 41.066 
(107.531) 
58.339 
(65.608) 
-148.779* 
(82.314) 
49.836 
(50.222) 
PROFIT_GROWTH(-1) -0.074 
(0.232) 
0.290** 
(0.141) 
-0.379** 
(0.168) 
-0.386*** 
(0.103) 
PROFIT_GROWTH(-2) 0.079 
(0.098) 
0.079 
(0.098) 
-0.526** 
(0.254) 
-0.339** 
(0.155) 
PROFIT_GROWTH (-3) -0.006 
(0.104) 
-0.006 
(0.104) 
-0.468** 
(0.213) 
0.293** 
(0.130) 
EXCESS_RETURNS(-1) 0.201 
(0.148) 
0.155 
(0.091). 
0.245 
(0.171) 
-0.060 
(0.104) 
EXCESS_RETURNS(-2) -0.290** 
(0.144) 
0.049 
(0.088) 
-0.330 
(0.186). 
0.137 
(0.114) 
EXCESS_RETURNS(-3) 0.021 
(0.130) 
0.037 
(0.079) 
-0.105 
(0.219) 
0.042 
(0.133) 
 
Note: This table reports four equations of the TVAR model that links corporate profits growth (PROFIT_GROWTH), the degree of 
market mispricing (DEV_MKT) and the stock market’s excess returns (EXCESS_RETURNS). The threshold variable is DEV_MKT with 
a one-quarter lag. The equations reported explain the variation in market mispricing (DEV_MKT) and corporate profits growth 
(PROFIT_GROWTH). The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please 
refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
31 
 
Figure 1: The time-varying dynamics of the US stock market’s quarterly Hurst exponent 
 
 
 
Note: This figure visualizes the time variation of the quarterly Hurst exponent levels estimated for the US stock 
market from the first quarter of 1970 until the fourth quarter of 2014. The Hurst exponents are estimated using 
equation (3) for the 63 trading days for each quarter. This figure also depicts a best-fit line highlighting the negative 
trend in the quarterly Hurst exponent levels in the post-Bretton Woods period. 
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
Highlights 
 Temporary mispricing incentivizes the collection of relevant information  
 Acquisitions by mispriced acquirers generate high acquirer shareholder returns  
 Acquisitions of mispriced targets generate high acquirer shareholder returns  
 Market-wide mispricing is associated with future increases in profit growth  
 These results hold after controlling for various economic/financial factors  
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